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Abstract
This work examines the possibility, performance limits, and associated costs for a self-sustained
relay to transmit its own covert information to a destination on top of forwarding the source’s informa-
tion. Since the source provides energy to the relay for forwarding its information, the source does not
allow the relay’s covert transmission and is to detect it. Considering the time switching (TS) and power
splitting (PS) schemes for energy harvesting, where all the harvested energy is used for transmission at
the self-sustained relay, we derive the minimum detection error probability ξ∗ at the source, based on
which we determine the maximum effective covert rate Ψ∗ subject to a given covertness constraint on
ξ∗. Our analysis shows that ξ∗ is the same for the TS and PS schemes, which leads to the fact that the
cost of achieving Ψ∗ in both the two schemes in terms of the required increase in the energy conversion
efficiency at the relay is the same, although the values of Ψ∗ in these two schemes can be different
in specific scenarios. For example, the TS scheme outperforms the PS scheme in terms of achieving a
higher Ψ∗ when the transmit power at the source is relatively low. If the covertness constraint is tighter
than a specific value, it is the covertness constraint that limits Ψ∗, and otherwise it is upper bound on
the energy conversion efficiency that limits Ψ∗.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become an indispensable part of our daily life, which have been
widely used in civilian and military scenarios for communications. Security is a critical issue in
wireless communications, since a large amount of important and private information is transferred
over these wireless networks. Wireless communications are inherently public and visible in
nature due to the open wireless medium, which is undesirable to preserve security and allows
any unauthorized transceiver to detect, or eavesdrop on the wireless communications [1], [2].
Against this background, conventional cryptography [3], [4] and information-theoretic physical
layer security technologies [5]–[8] have been developed to offer progressively higher levels
of security by protecting the content of the message against eavesdropping. However, these
technologies cannot mitigate the threat to a user’s security and privacy from discovering the
presence of the user or transmissions. As such, hiding a wireless transmission in the first place
is widely demanded in some application scenarios. To meet this demand, covert communications
have become a prominent solution to enable a wireless transmission between two users while
guaranteeing a negligible probability of being detected by a warden [9]–[13].
In the literature of covert communications, the authors of [9] demonstrated that O(√n) bits of
information can be transmitted to a legitimate receiver reliably and covertly in n channel uses
as n → ∞ over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, which is termed as square
root law. Following [9], covert communications have been studied in different scenarios. For
example, covert communications can be achieved when the warden has uncertainty about the
receiver noise power [14], [15]. In [16], [17], the collaborative jammer comes to help to realize
the covert communications. The effect of finite blocklength (i.e., a finite number of channel
uses) over AWGN channels on covert communications was investigated in [18], [19]. A covert
communication system under block fading channels was examined in [20], where transceivers
have uncertainty on the related channel state information (CSI). In [21], [22], the authors utilized
a full-duplex receiver to achieve covert communications in wireless fading channels and analyzed
the covert communication limits. The covert communication with interference uncertainty from
non-cooperative transmitters is studied in [23].
3In some scenarios of wireless communication networks, a source node, instead of trans-
mitting directly to a destination, transmits information to the destination with the aid of one
of its neighbour nodes as a relay. Covert communications in the context of relay networks
was examined in [24], [25], which showed that a relay can transmit confidential information
to a corresponding destination covertly on top of forwarding the source’s information to the
destination. Multi-hop covert communications over an arbitrary network in the presence of
multiple collaborating wardens were investigated in [26]. In some practical scenarios, the relay
node may be subject to energy limitation, since they can be powered by batteries. As such,
the limited energy storage capacity of battery powered devices severely limits the lifetime
of wireless communication networks, for example, in some practical application scenarios of
Internet of Things (IoT). Although battery replacement provides an immediate solution to the
energy shortage issue, frequent replacements of batteries can be inconvenient. Against this
background, a promising technique named wireless energy harvesting and information processing
provides new opportunities and great convenience to solve the limited energy issues (e.g., [27]–
[33]). With this technique, the source node can transfer energy through wireless communications
to the relay and then requests the relay to help forwarding information to the destination. In this
context, the energy and power are precious resources and thus the source node does not prefer
or allow the relay node to use the harvested power for transmitting other information other than
forwarding the source’s information to the destination. As such, the relay’s transmission of its
own information should be kept covert from the source in order to guarantee the invisibility of
this transmission.
In this work, we examine the possibility, performance limits, and associated costs for the relay
to transmit its own information covertly to the destination with the harvested energy on top of
forwarding the source’s information, while the source is monitoring the wireless environments to
detect this covert transmission. Specifically, we consider two existing energy harvesting strategies
at the relay, namely the time switching (TS) and power splitting (PS) schemes, and aim to
determine their performance in terms of the achievable effective covert rate from the relay to the
destination subject to a specific covert communication constraint ξ∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ, where ξ∗ denotes
4the minimum detection error probability at the source and ǫ is a small value specifying the
required covertness. Note that in the TS scheme the signals used for energy harvesting and
information processing at the relay are received from the source in different time slots, while in
the PS scheme these signals are received simultaneously and then split into two streams with
one stream processed by the energy receiver and the other processed by the information receiver.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We first detail the strategies of transmitting covert information within the TS and PS schemes
at the relay, focusing on determining the transmit power of the forwarded information and
the covert information. Our analysis shows that in order to transmit its own information (i.e.,
covert information) without affecting forwarding the source’s information to the destination,
the relay has to harvest extra energy from the source. To this end, the relay has to adopt a
more powerful energy harvester with a higher conversion efficiency factor when it transmits
covert information relative to when it does not transmit covert information to the destination.
The increase in the conversion efficiency factor represents a cost of the relay’s covert
transmission and thus we target at determining the amount of this increase in order to
achieve the covert transmission limits from the relay to the destination for both the TS and
PS schemes.
• We develop the optimal detector at the source and derive its detection performance limit
in terms of the minimum detection error probability for both the TS and PS schemes.
Specifically, we first determine a sufficient test statistic at the source and construct a
decision rule by comparing it to an arbitrary detection threshold. Then, we derive the false
alarm and miss detection rates for any given detection threshold in closed-form expressions,
based on which we analytically obtain the optimal detection threshold that minimizes the
detection error probability. Our analysis indicates that the source’s minimum detection error
probabilities for the TS and PS schemes are exactly the same depending only on the ratio
of the conversion efficiency factor η1 of the energy harvester when the relay transmit covert
information to the conversion efficiency factor η0 when the relay does not transmit covert
information.
5• We derive the required minimum conversion efficiency factor η∗1 in a closed-form expression
for any given η0 in order to achieve the maximum effective covert rate Ψ
∗ subject to
ξ∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ for both the TS and PS schemes. Although the achieved maximum effective
covert rates within these two schemes are different, our analysis demonstrates that the
required η∗1 is the same for these two schemes, which indicates that the cost of achieving
Ψ∗ in terms of the conversion efficiency increase is the same for these two schemes. Our
analysis also shows that the value of ǫ determines the limit on Ψ∗ and this limit depends on
η0 (i.e., the conversion efficiency factor when the relay does not transmit covert information)
and ηu (i.e., an upper bound on the conversion efficiency factor).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II details our system model and
adopted assumptions. In Section III, we analyze the source’s detection performance and the
covert communication limits for the TS scheme. Section IV presents our analysis on the source’s
detection performance limits and covert communications with the PS scheme. Section V provides
numerical results to thoroughly compare the TS and PS schemes, based on which we provide
useful insights with regard to the impact of some system parameters on the achieved covert
communications. Section VI draws conclusions.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols. Vectors are denoted by lower-case
boldface symbols. Given a vector x, x[i] denotes the i-th element of x. Given a complex number,
| · | denotes its modulus. E[·] denotes expectation operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
As shown in Fig. 1, this work considers an one-way relay network with three nodes: the source
(Alice), the relay, and the destination (Bob). Each node is equipped with a single antenna and
operates in the half-duplex mode. We assume the wireless channels within our system model are
subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading with equal block length and the channel
coefficients are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. We also assume that the direct
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Fig. 1. Covert communications with a wireless-powered relay.
link from Alice to Bob is not available due to blockage and the transmission from Alice to
Bob has to be aided by the relay. As such, the transmission from Alice to Bob occurs in two
phases within one fading block. In the first phase, Alice transmits energy and information to
the relay. In the second phase, the self-sustained relay forwards the information from Alice to
Bob with the harvested energy from Alice in the first phase. It is assumed that the total time of
transmission is T .
The channel from Alice to the relay is denoted by har and the channel from the relay to
Bob is denoted by hrb. We assume that the relay knows both har and hrb perfectly. The energy
consumption required for obtaining the CSI of har and hrb at the relay is assumed to be negligible
compared to the power used for signal transmission [27]. In practical wireless communication
systems, CSI is usually obtained through CSI feedback from a receiver to a transmitter [34]. In
this work, we assume the relay does not feed back CSI to Alice and thus seeks to transmit its
own information to Bob on top of forwarding Alice’s information, which should be kept covert
from Alice, since Alice does not allow the relay to transmit its own information by using her
energy. As such, in this work we assume that hra is unknown to Alice.
B. Transmission Strategy
During the first phase of the cooperative transmission from Alice to Bob, the self-sustained
relay harvests energy and receives the signals from Alice. We note that the procedures of
energy harvesting and information processing are sequential and simultaneous for the TS and
7PS schemes, respectively. In the second phase the relay forwards Alice’s signals to Bob with
the harvested energy, when the relay can decide whether to transmit its own message (covert
message) to Bob on top of forwarding Alice’s information. In this work, we assume that all the
harvested energy at the relay will be used for transmission in the same block and the information
(e.g., conversion efficiency) on the energy harvester that is used when the relay does not transmit
covert information is publicly known. As such, in order to avoid the impact of transmitting
covert information on forwarding Alice’s information, the relay has to harvest more energy from
Alice by using a more powerful energy harvester with a higher conversion efficiency when it
does transmit covert information to Bob [35]. In this work, our analysis aims to help the relay
determine the conversion efficiency of this required more powerful energy harvester in order to
achieve the limits of the covert transmission from the relay to Bob, which will also indicate the
cost of this covert transmission.
C. Binary Detection at Alice
Since Alice transmits energy to the relay in order to enable it forwarding Alice’s information to
Bob, the transmission of the relay will be monitored by Alice, who tries to detect the illegitimate
usage of the harvested energy. To this end, Alice is to detect the wireless transmission of the
covert information (the relay’s own information to Bob, not the forwarded information) from the
relay to Bob. As such, Alice has a binary hypothesis detection problem, in which the relay does
not transmit covert message to Bob in the null hypothesis H0, while it does in the alternative
hypothesis H1. We define P (H0) = 1 − ω as the probability that Alice does not transmit and
P (H1) = ω as the probability that Alice transmits in time. P(D1|H0) = α is the false alarm rate
and P(D0|H1) = β is the miss detection rate, while D1 and D0 are the binary decisions that
infer whether the relay transmits covert message to Bob or not, respectively. The probability of
error at Alice is given by
Pe , P(D1|H0)P (H0) + P(D0|H1)P (H1)
= (1− ω)α+ ωβ. (1)
8The ultimate goal for Alice is to detect whether her observation comes from H0 or H1 by
applying a specific decision rule. A random guess of relay’s transmission lead to the priors
ω = 1/2. As such, the covert communication constraint considered in this work is that the
detection error probability at Alice should be no less than 1− ǫ, i.e., ξ ≥ 1− ǫ, where ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
is a predetermined value to specify the covert communication constraint [9], [17], [36], and the
detection error probability ξ is defined as
ξ , α + β. (2)
In the following two sections, we analyze the detection performance of Alice in the TS and
PS schemes adopted by the relay to harvest energy from Alice, based on which the limits of
covert transmissions from the relay to Bob are determined.
III. TIME SWITCHING SCHEME
In the TS scheme, φ is the fraction of the block time allocated to energy harvesting by
the self-sustained relay from Alice, where we have 0 < φ < 1. The remaining block time is
divided into two equal parts, namely (1−φ)T/2, for information transmissions from Alice to the
relay and from the relay to Bob, respectively. In this section, we first detail these transmissions
and then analyze the detection performance at Alice together with the performance of covert
communications from the relay to Bob.
A. Transmission from Alice to the Relay
When Alice transmits signals, the received signal at relay is given by
yr[i] =
√
PaLarharxa[i] + nr,a[i] + nr,c[i], (3)
where Pa is the transmit power of Alice, Lar , ω(dar)−m is the path loss, m is the path loss
exponent, ω is a constant value depending on carrier frequency, which is commonly set as
[c/(4πfc)]
2 with c = 3 × 108 m/s and fc as the carrier frequency [37], dar is the distance
from Alice to the relay, xa is the signal transmitted by Alice satisfying E[xa[i]x
†
a[i]] = 1,
i = 1, 2, . . . , n is the index of each channel use, nr,a[i] is the baseband additive white Gaussian
9noise (AWGN) at the relay, with σ2r,a as its variance, i.e., nr,a[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2r,a), and nr,c[i] is the
sampled AWGN due to the signal conversion from radio frequency (RF) band to baseband with
σ2r,c as its variance, i.e., nr,c[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2r,c). As such, the total noise power at relay is given by
σ2r , σ
2
r,a + σ
2
r,c. (4)
Then, the maximum energy the relay can possibly harvest (with the highest conversion efficiency
factor 1) is given by
EEHmax = PaLar|har|2φT. (5)
We note that this is not the actual amount of energy that can be harvested by the relay, which
depends on the actual conversion efficiency factor.
B. Transmission from the Relay to Bob
As the relay operates in the amplify-and-forward (AF) mode, it will forward a linearly amplified
version of the received signal given in (3) to Bob. As such, the forwarded signal xr[i] is given
by
xr[i] = Gyr[i]
= G
(√
PaLarharxa[i] + nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
, (6)
where G is a scaling scalar. In order to guarantee the power constraint at relay, the value of G
is chosen such that E[xr[i]x
†
r[i]] = 1, which leads to
G =
1√
PaLar|har|2 + σ2r
. (7)
1) Transmission of the Relay without Covert Information: Under the null hypothesisH0 (when
the relay does not transmit its covert information to Bob), the relay only transmits xr to Bob.
Accordingly, the received signal at Bob is given by
yb[i] =
√
P 0r Lrbhrbxr[i] + nb,a[i] + nb,c[i]
=
√
P 0r LrbhrbG
(√
PaLarharxa[i] + nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
+ nb,a[i] + nb,c[i], (8)
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where Lrb , ω(drb)−m is the path loss, drb is the distance from relay to Bob, nb,a[i] is the
AWGN at Bob with σ2b,a as its variance, i.e., σ
2
b,a[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2b,a), and nb,c[i] is the sampled
AWGN at Bob due to RF band to baseband signal conversion with σ2b,c as its variance, i.e.,
σ2b,c[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2b,c). As such, the total noise power at Bob is given by
σ2b , σ
2
b,a + σ
2
b,c. (9)
We note that in (8), P 0r is the transmit power of xr at the relay under H0. Since all the harvested
energy is used for transmission at the relay, P 0r is given by
P 0r =
η0E
EH
max
((1− φ)T/2)
=
2η0φPaLar|har|2
(1− φ) , (10)
where η0 is the conversion efficiency factor of the energy harvester under H0, which is publicly
known. Then, following (8) the SNR for xa at Bob is derived as
γ0b =
P 0r Lrb|hrb|2G2PaLar|har|2
P 0r Lrb|hrb|2G2σ2r + σ2b
. (11)
The parameter φ that maximizes effective rate of xa can be numerically obtained based on the
method detailed in [27] and thus it is assumed publicly known in this work. The value of φ is
the same under H0 and H1, since it should be agreed between Alice and the relay.
2) Transmission of the Relay with Covert Information: Under the alternative hypothesis H1
(when relay transmits the covert information to Bob on top of forwarding xa), the received signal
at Bob is given by
yb[i] =
√
P 1r Lrbhrbxr[i] +
√
P crLrbhrbxc[i] + nb[i]
=
√
P 1r LrbhrbG
(√
PaLarharxa[i] + nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
+
√
P crLrbhrbxc[i] + nb,a[i] + nb,c[i],
(12)
where P 1r is the relay’s transmit power of xr under H1 and P cr is the relay’s transmit power of
the covert information xc satisfying E[xc[i]x
†
c[i]] = 1. Again, since all the harvested energy is
used for transmission in the relay, the total transmit power of relay is given by
P 1r + P
c
r =
η1E
EH
max
((1− φ)T/2)
=
2η1φPaLar|har|2
(1− φ) , (13)
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where η1 is the conversion efficiency factor of the energy harvester under H1. Considering the
practical scenarios, we have η1 ≤ ηu < 1, where ηu is the upper bound of conversion efficiency
factor. As previously mentioned, the covert transmission from relay to Bob should not affect the
transmission from Alice to Bob. As such, here we assume that Bob always first decodes xa with
xc as interference. Following (12), the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for xa at
Bob is derived as
γ1b =
P 1r Lrb|hrb|2G2PaLar|har|2
P 1r Lrb|hrb|2G2σ2r + P crLrb|hrb|2 + σ2b
. (14)
We should guarantee that γ0b = γ
1
b in order to avoid the impact of the covert transmission from
the relay to Bob on the transmission from Alice to Bob. Thus, following (11), (13), and (14)
the transmit power of xa is given by
P 1r =
2η0φPaLar|har|2 [2η1φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + (1− φ)σ2b ]
(1− φ) (2η0φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + (1− φ)σ2b )
. (15)
Following (10) and (15), we have
P 1r =
2η1φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + (1− φ)σ2b
2η0φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + (1− φ)σ2b
P 0r > P
0
r , (16)
which confirms that the relay requires more power to forward xa under H1 in order to guarantee
the same end-to-end SNR/SINR of xa at Bob under H0. This is due to the fact that the covert
information xc causes interference at Bob for decoding xa. This indicates that the relay has to
harvest more energy to support its covert transmission, which leads to η1 > η0. This means that
the relay has to own an energy harvester with a higher conversion efficiency factor in order to
conduct covert transmission on top of forwarding Alice’s information to Bob. The increase in
the conversion efficiency factor is a cost of the relay’s covert transmission. In the following, we
are going to determine the minimum value of η1 to achieve the covert communication limits
from the relay to Bob. Intuitively, the relay can purchase an energy harvester with the highest
conversion efficiency factor 1 and only use partial of the harvested energy to perform covert
transmission in order to guarantee the covert communication constraint (i.e., ξ∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ). We
note that a higher conversion efficiency factor means a higher cost and thus in this work we
focus on the minimum value of η1 that achieves the covert communication limits that indicates
12
the lowest cost of the relay’s covert transmission. Following (13) and (15), the transmit power
of xc at the relay is given by
P cr =
2η1φPaLar|har|2
1− φ − P
1
r
=
2(η1 − η0)φPaLar|har|2σ2b
2η0φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + (1− φ)σ2b
. (17)
C. Detection Performance and Optimal Detection Threshold at Alice
In this subsection, we present the optimal detection strategy at Alice and her detection perfor-
mance limits. To this end, we first determine a sufficient test statistic at Alice, based on which
we construct a decision rule for an arbitrary detection threshold. Then, we derive the detection
performance in terms of the false alarm and miss detection rates for any given detection threshold.
Finally, we analytically obtain the optimal detection threshold that minimizes the detection error
probability.
When the relay transmits to Bob, Alice will detect whether the relay transmits xc on top of
forwarding xa to Bob. We recall that the relay does not transmit xc in the null hypothesis H0
while it does in the alternative hypothesis H1. Then, the received signal at Alice (when the relay
transmits signals) is given by
ya[i] =


√
P 0r Lrahraxr[i] + na[i], H0,√
P 1r Lrahraxr[i] +
√
P crLrahraxc[i] + na[i], H1,
(18)
where Lra is the path loss from the relay to Alice, na[i] is the baseband additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at relay with σ2a as its variance, i.e., σ
2
a[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2a). In this work we assume
that Willie employs a radiometer as his detection test [14]. Considering the infinite blocklength,
i.e., n→∞, we have
T =


P 0r Lra|hra|2 + σ2a, H0,
P 1r Lra|hra|2 + P crLra|hra|2 + σ2a, H1,
a
=


2η0φPaL2ar|har|4
1−φ + σ
2
a, H0,
2η1φPaL2ar|har|4
1−φ + σ
2
a, H1,
(19)
13
and
a
= is achieved by using (10) and (13). Then, the decision rule in the adopted detector at
Alice can be written as
T
D1
≷
D0
τ, (20)
where τ is the threshold for T , which will be optimized later in order to minimize the detection
error probability. Following (20), we derive the false alarm and miss detection rates at Alice for
an arbitrary threshold τ in the following theorem, based on which we will tackle the optimization
of τ in Theorem 2.
Theorem 1: The false alarm and miss detection rates at Alice for an arbitrary detection
threshold τ are, respectively, derived as
α =


1, τ < σ2a,
exp
{
− 1
λar
√
(τ−σ2a)(1−φ)
2η0φPaL2ar
}
, τ > σ2a,
(21)
β =


0, τ < σ2a,
1− exp
{
− 1
λar
√
(τ−σ2a)(1−φ)
2η1φPaL2ar
}
, τ > σ2a.
(22)
Proof: For a given τ , following (19) and (20), the false alarm rate and miss detection rate
are, respectively, given by
α = P
[
2η0φPaL
2
ar|har|4
1− φ + σ
2
a ≥ τ
]
=


1, τ < σ2a,
P
[
|har|4 ≥ (τ−σ2a)(1−φ)2η0φPaL2ar
]
, τ > σ2a,
(23)
β = P
[
2η1φPaL
2
ar|har|4
1− φ + σ
2
a < τ
]
=


0, τ < σ2a,
P
[
|har|4 < (τ−σ2a)(1−φ)2η1φPaL2ar
]
, τ > σ2a.
(24)
Considering quasi-static Rayleigh fading, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of |har|4
is given by F|har|4(x) = 1 − exp(−
√
x/λar). Following (23) and (24), we achieve the desired
results in (21) and (22) after some algebra manipulations.
Theorem 2: The optimal threshold that minimizes ξ is derived as
τ ∗ = σ2a +
1
1− φ
[
λar
√
2φPaL2arη0η1
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)]2
. (25)
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Proof: Following (21) and (22), we have the detection error probability at Alice as
ξ =


1, τ ≤ σ2a,
1 + exp
{
− 1
λar
√
(τ−σ2a)(1−φ)
2η0φPaL2ar
}
−
exp
{
− 1
λar
√
(τ−σ2a)(1−φ)
2η1φPaL2ar
}
, τ > σ2a.
(26)
As per (26), Alice will not set τ ≤ σ2a, since ξ = 1 is the worst case for Alice. Following (26),
we derive the first derivative of ξ with respect to τ for τ > σ2a as ∂ξ/∂τ = κ1(τ)κ2(τ), where
κ1(τ) ,
√
1− φ exp
(
−
√
(τ−σ2a)(1−φ)
λar
√
2η1φPaL2ar
)
2λar
√
2η1φPaL2ar(τ − σ2a)
, (27)
κ2(τ) , 1−
√
η1
η0
exp
[
−
√
(τ − σ2a)(1− φ)
λar
√
2φPaL2ar
(
1√
η0
− 1√
η1
)]
. (28)
We note that κ1(τ) > 0 due to τ > σ
2
a. As such, the value of τ that ensures ∂ξ/∂τ = 0 is the
one guarantees κ2(τ) = 0, which is given by
τ † = σ2a +
1
1− φ
[
λar
√
2φPaL2arη0η1
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)]2
. (29)
We note that ∂ξ/∂τ < 0, for τ < τ †, and ∂ξ/∂τ > 0, for τ > τ †. This is due to the fact that the
term κ2(τ) given in (28) is monotonically increasing with respect to τ . Noting that τ
† > σ2a, we
have that τ † minimizes ξ for τ > σ2a. Noting ξ is a continuous function of τ , we can conclude
that the optimal threshold is τ †.
Corollary 1: The minimum value of the detection error probability ξ at Alice is
ξ∗ = 1− θ 12(1−√θ)
(
1√
θ
− 1
)
, (30)
where θ , η0/η1.
Proof: Substituting τ ∗ into (26), we obtain the minimum value of ξ, which is given by
ξ∗ = 1 + exp
{
−
√
η1
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)}
− exp
{
−
√
η0
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)}
. (31)
Following (31), we achieve the desired result in (30) after some algebra manipulations.
Remark 1: Corollary 1 indicates that the minimum detection error probability ξ∗ only depends
on θ = η0/η1 rather than any other system parameters. This is a surprising result and is due
to the fact that the impact of other system parameters has been eliminated by the optimal
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detection threshold, which is confirmed by that the false alarm and miss detection rates derived
in Theorem 1 together with the optimal detection threshold achieved in Theorem 2 are functions
of the other system parameters.
Remark 2: The minimum detection error probability ξ∗ is a monotonically increasing function
of θ, which is confirmed by
∂ξ∗
∂θ
= − ln(θ)
4θ(1 −√θ)θ
1
2(1−
√
θ) > 0. (32)
This means that for a fixed η0, ξ
∗ decreases as η1 increases (it becomes easier for Alice to
detection the relay’s covert transmission). Intuitively, this is due to that as η1 increases the relay
will transmit the covert information with a higher power, since all the harvested energy is used
for transmission at the relay.
Corollary 2: The value range of ξ∗ is [1 − (η0/ηu)
√
ηu/(2(
√
ηu−√η0))(
√
ηu/
√
η0 − 1), 1], where
ηu is the upper bound of conversion efficiency factor.
Proof: Noting θ = η0/η1, for a given η0 the minimum value of θ is achieved when η1 = ηu.
Following Remark 2, the minimum value of ξ∗ in (30) is given by
ξ∗
(
θ =
η0
ηu
)
= 1−
(
η0
ηu
) √ηu
2(
√
ηu−
√
η0)
(√
ηu√
η0
− 1
)
. (33)
The maximum value of θ is achieved when η1 = η0. Then, using L’Hospital’s rule, we can obtain
the maximum value of ξ∗ as θ→ 1, as shown below:
lim
θ→1
ξ∗(θ) = 1+lim
θ→1
exp
{
ln (θ)
2(1−√θ)
}
−lim
θ→1
exp
{√
θ ln (θ)
2(1−√θ)
}
= 1. (34)
This completes the proof of Corollary 2.
D. Optimization of Covert Transmission
When the relay transmits covert information, Bob first decodes xa and then subtracts the
corresponding component from its received signal yb given in (52) in order to decode the covert
information xc. As such, the effective received signal used to decode xc is given by
y˜b[i] =
√
P crLrbhrbxc[i] +
√
P 1r LrbhrbG
(
nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
+ nb,a[i] + nb,c[i]. (35)
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Then, following (35) the SNR for xc at Bob is
γc =
P crLrb|hrb|2
P 1r Lrb|hrb|2G2σ2r + σ2b
(36)
b
=
(Q2 −Q1)σ2b
Q1[Q2+(1−φ)σ2b )]σ2r
(1−φ)(PaLar|har|2+σ2r) + [Q1 + (1− φ)σ2b ] σ2b
,
where
Q1 , 2η0φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2,
Q2 , 2η1φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2, (37)
and
b
= is obtained based on (7), (15), and (17). Following (36) and considering Rayleigh fading
for har and hrb, the average rate of the covert transmission from the relay to Bob is given by
C =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log2 {1 + γc} f|har|2(x)f|hrb|2(y)dxdy
=
1
λarλrb
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−
(
x
λar
+
y
λrb
)]
×
log

1 + [Q2(x, y)−Q1(x, y)]σ
2
b
Q1(x,y)[Q2(x,y)+(1−φ)σ2b ]σ2r
(1−ρ)PaLarx+σ2r + [Q1(x, y) + (1− φ)σ2b ]σ2b

 dxdy. (38)
Since (1 − φ)T/2 is the effective communication time between the relay and Bob in the total
block time T , for the TS scheme the effective covert rate is defined as
Ψ =
[(1− φ)T/2]
T
C
=
(1− φ)
2
C. (39)
In this work, we consider η1 as the only system parameter of interest, which represents the
conversion efficiency factor under H1 (where the relay transmit covert information on top of
forwarding Alice’s messages to Bob) and thus indicates the cost of the relay’s covert transmission.
As such, the optimization problem at relay of maximizing the effective covert rate subject to a
certain covert communication constraint is given by
max
η0≤η1≤ηu
Ψ
s. t. ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
(40)
The maximum value of Ψ is then achieved by substituting the optimal value of η1 (which is
derived in the following theorem) into (39), which is denoted by Ψ∗.
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Theorem 3: For a given conversion efficiency factor η0 under H0, the optimal value (i.e., mini-
mum value) of η1 that maximizes the effective covert rate Ψ subject to the covert communication
constraint ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1− ǫ is given by
η∗1 =


η0
θǫ
, ǫ ≤
(
η0
ηu
) √ηu
2(
√
ηu−
√
η0)
(√
ηu
η0
− 1
)
,
ηu, otherwise,
(41)
where θǫ is the solution of θ to ξ
∗(θ) = 1− ǫ and ξ∗(θ) can be obtained as per (30).
Proof: As mentioned in Remark 2, the minimum detection error probability ξ∗ is a monoton-
ically increasing function of θ. As such, we have η1 ≤ θǫ/η0 in order to guarantee ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Following (36), γc can be rewritten as a function of η1, which is given by
γc =
B1(1− η0/η1)
B2 +B3/η1
, (42)
where
B1 , 2(1− φ)φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2σ2b (PaLar|har|2 + σ2r),
B2 , 4η0φ
2P 2aL
2
ar|har|4Lrb|hrb|2,
B3 , (1− φ)σ2b
[
2η0φPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2σ2r + PaLar|har|2 + σ2r
]
. (43)
Following (42) and noting that the terms (i.e., B1, B2, and B3) in (43) are no less than 0, we can
conclude that γc is monotonically increasing with respect to η1 for any value of |har|2 and |hrb|2.
Then, following the Leibniz integral rule we know that Ψ is a monotonically increasing function
of η1. As such, the optimal value of η1 to the optimization problem given in (40) without the
constraint η1 ≤ ηu is the one that guarantees ξ∗(θ) = 1 − ǫ. Considering η1 ≤ ηu, we finally
have the desired result as given in (41).
Remark 3: Following Theorem 3, we note that when η∗1 = η0/θǫ, it is the covert communication
constraint that limits the effective covert rate, since θǫ is determined only by ǫ rather than any
other system parameters. When η1 = ηu, it is the energy harvester that limits the effective covert
rate, since the relay cannot harvest more energy to conduct the covert transmission (although
it is allowed to do that, i.e., ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1 − ǫ can still be guaranteed if the relay transmits covert
information with higher power).
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Remark 4: If the relay sets η1 = ηu when η
∗
1 = η0/θǫ < ηu and only uses partial of the
harvested energy to perform covert transmission, it can still guarantee the covert communication
constraint ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. However, this means that the relay uses an energy harvester with the
highest conversion efficiency factor 1 rather than the required minimum conversion efficiency
factor η∗1 , which also means that relay wastes some harvested energy and wastes some cost on
operating a better energy harvester than the necessary one.
IV. POWER SPLITTING SCHEME
In the PS scheme, half of the block time (i.e., T/2) is used for simultaneous information and
power transfer from Alice to the relay and the remaining T/2 block time is used for information
transmission from the relay to Bob. In order to harvest energy, the relay splits the received
signals from Alice into two fractions during the first T/2 block time. In this work, we denote the
fraction used for energy harvesting as ρ and the remaining fraction 1−ρ is used for information
transmission, where we have 0 < ρ < 1.
A. Transmission from Alice to the Relay
After the signal splitting, the received signal at the relay for information delivery is given by
yr[i] =
√
PaLar(1− ρ)harxa[i] +
√
(1− ρ)nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]. (44)
and the total noise power at relay is given by
σ2r , (1− ρ)σ2r,a + σ2r,c. (45)
Then, the maximum energy the relay can possibly harvest (with the highest conversion efficiency
factor 1) is given by
EEHmax = ρPaLar|har|2(T/2). (46)
Again, it should be noted that this is not the actual amount of energy that can be harvested by
the relay, which depends on the actual conversion efficiency factor.
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B. Transmission from the Relay to Bob
In this subsection, we detail the transmission strategies of the relay when it does and does not
transmit covert information to Bob in the PS scheme. Similar to (6), the forwarded signal xr[i]
at the relay is given by
xr[i] = Gyr[i] (47)
= G
(√
PaLar(1− ρ)harxa[i] +
√
(1− ρ)nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
.
In order to guarantee the power constraint at relay, the value ofG is chosen such that E[xr[i]x
†
r[i]] =
1, which leads to
G =
1√
(1− ρ)PaLar|har|2 + σ2r
. (48)
1) Transmission of the Relay without Covert Information: Under H0, the relay does not
transmit covert information and only transmits xr to Bob. Accordingly, the received signal at
Bob is given by
yb[i] =
√
P 0r Lrbhrbxr[i] + nb,a[i] + nb,c[i] (49)
=
√
P 0r LrbhrbG0
(√
PaLar(1− ρ)harxa[i] +
√
(1− ρ)nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
+ nb,a[i] + nb,c[i],
where we recall that nb,a[i] and nb,c[i] are defined in (9) and P
0
r is the transmit power of xr
under H0, which is given by
P 0r =
η0E
EH
max
(T/2)
= η0ρPaLar|har|2. (50)
Then, following (49), the SNR for xa under H0 at Bob is derived as
γ0b =
P 0r Lrb|hrb|2G2Pa(1− ρ)Lar|har|2
P 0r Lrb|hrb|2G2σ2r + σ2b
. (51)
The parameter ρ that maximizes effective rate of xa can be numerically obtained based on the
method detailed in [27] and thus it is assumed publicly known in this work. We note that ρ
can be different under H0 and H1 in the PS scheme, which is different from the TS scheme,
since the value of ρ is solely determined by the relay. However, in this work we do not consider
different values of ρ under H0 and H1 in order to seek a fair comparison between the TS and
PS schemes.
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2) Transmission of the Relay with Covert Information: Under H1, the relay transmits covert
information to Bob on top of forwarding xa and thus the received signal at Bob is given by
yb[i] =
√
P 1r Lrbhrbxr[i] +
√
P crLrbhrbxc[i] + nb,a[i] + nb,c[i]
=
√
P 1r LrbhrbG
(√
PaLar(1− ρ)harxa[i] +
√
(1− ρ)nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
+√
P crLrbhrbxc[i] + nb,a[i] + nb,c[i], (52)
where P 1r is the relay’s transmit power of xr in this case and P
c
r is the relay’s transmit power
of xc satisfying E[xc[i]x
†
c[i]] = 1. As assumed, all the harvested energy at the relay is used for
transmission and thus the total transmit power of the relay is given by
P 1r + P
c
r =
η1E
EH
max
T/2
= η1ρPaLar|har|2, (53)
where η1 is the conversion efficiency factor of the energy harvester adopted under H1. Following
(52), the SINR for xa at Bob is derived as
γ1b =
P 1r Lrb|hrb|2G2Pa(1− ρ)Lar|har|2
P 1r Lrb|hrb|2G2σ2r + P crLrb|hrb|2 + σ2b
. (54)
Again, in order avoid any impact of covert transmission on the transmission from Alice to Bob,
we should guarantee γ0b = γ
1
b . As such, following (51), (53), and (54) the transmit power for
forwarding xa under H1 is given by
P 1r =
η0ρPaLar|har|2 (η1ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + σ2b )
η0ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + σ2b
. (55)
As per (50) and (55), we again have
P 1r =
η1ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + σ2b
η0ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + σ2b
P 0r > P
0
r , (56)
which means that the relay requires more power to forward xa when it transmits covert infor-
mation to Bob. Based on (53) and (55), the transmit power of the covert information at the relay
is given by
P cr = η1ρPaLar|har|2 − P 1r
=
(η1 − η0)ρPaLar|har|2σ2b
η0ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2 + σ2b
. (57)
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C. Detection Performance and Optimal Detection Threshold at Alice
In this subsection, we present the optimal detection strategy at Alice and her detection perfor-
mance limits. Firstly, a decision rule for an arbitrary detection threshold is constructed based on
a sufficient test statistic. Then, we derive the detection performance in terms of the false alarm
and miss detection rates for any given detection threshold. Finally, we analytically obtain the
optimal detection threshold that minimizes the detection error probability.
Similar to (18), for n→∞, the term defined in (19) at Alice in the PS scheme is given by
T =


P 0r Lra|hra|2+σ2a, H0,
P 1r Lra|hra|2+P crLra|hra|2+σ2a, H1,
=


η0ρPaL
2
ar|har|4 + σ2a, H0,
η1ρPaL
2
ar|har|4 + σ2a, H1.
(58)
The false alarm and miss detection rates at Alice for an arbitrary detection threshold τ in the
following theorem, based on which we will tackle the optimization of τ in Theorem 5.
Theorem 4: In the PS scheme, the false alarm and miss detection rates at Alice for an arbitrary
detection threshold τ are, respectively, derived as
α =


1, τ < σ2a,
exp
{
− 1
λar
√
τ−σ2a
η0ρPaL2ar
}
, τ > σ2a,
(59)
β =


0, τ < σ2a,
1− exp
{
− 1
λar
√
τ−σ2a
η1ρPadL2ar
}
, τ > σ2a.
(60)
Proof: For a given τ , following (20) and (58), the false alarm rate and miss detection rate
are, respectively, given by
α = P [η0ρPaL2ar|har|4 + σ2a ≥ τ]
=


1, τ < σ2a,
P
[
|har|4 ≥ τ−σ2aη0ρPaL2ar
]
, τ > σ2a,
(61)
β = P [η1ρPaL2ar|har|4 + σ2a < τ]
=


0, τ < σ2a,
P
[
|har|4 < τ−σ2aη1ρPaL2ar
]
, τ > σ2a.
(62)
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Considering F|har|4(x) = 1 − exp(−
√
x/λar), we achieve the desired results in (59) and (60)
after some algebra manipulations, as per (61) and (62).
Theorem 5: The optimal threshold that minimizes ξ in the PS scheme is derived as
τ ∗ = σ2a +
[
λar
√
ρPaL2arη0η1
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)]2
. (63)
Proof: Following (59) and (60), we have the detection error probability at Alice as
ξ =


1, τ ≤ σ2a,
1 + exp
{
−
√
τ−σ2a
λar
√
η0ρPaL2ar
}
− exp
{
−
√
τ−σ2a
λar
√
η1ρPaL2ar
}
, τ > σ2a.
(64)
Again, Alice will not set τ ≤ σ2a, since ξ = 1 is the worst case for Alice. Following (64), we
derive the first derivative of ξ with respect to τ for τ > σ2a as ∂ξ∂τ = κ3(τ)κ4(τ), where
κ3(τ) ,
exp
(
−
√
τ−σ2a
λar
√
η1ρPaL2ar
)
2λar
√
η1ρPaL2ar(τ − σ2a)
, (65)
κ4(τ) , 1−
√
η1
η0
exp
[
−
√
τ − σ2a
λar
√
ρPaL2ar
(
1√
η0
− 1√
η1
)]
. (66)
We note that κ3(τ) > 0 due to τ > σ
2
a. As such, the value of τ that ensures ∂ξ/∂τ = 0 is the
one that guarantees κ4(τ) = 0, which is given by
τ † = σ2a +
[
λar
√
ρPaL2arη0η1
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)]2
. (67)
We note that ∂ξ/∂τ < 0 for τ < τ † and ∂ξ/∂τ > 0 for τ > τ †. This is due to the fact that the
term κ4(τ) given in (66) is monotonically increasing with respect to τ . Noting that τ
† > σ2a, we
can conclude that τ † minimizes ξ for τ > σ2a. Noting ξ is a continuous function of τ , we obtain
the optimal detection threshold as τ ∗ given in (63).
Corollary 3: The minimum value of the detection error probability ξ at Alice is derived as
ξ∗ = 1− θ 12(1−√θ)
(
1√
θ
− 1
)
, (68)
where we recall that θ , η0/η1.
Proof: Substituting τ ∗ into (64), we obtain the minimum value of ξ, which is given by
ξ∗ = 1 + exp
{
−
√
η1
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)}
− exp
{
−
√
η0
2(
√
η1 −√η0) ln
(
η1
η0
)}
. (69)
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Following (69), we achieve the desired result in (68) after some algebra manipulations.
Remark 5: Following Corollary 1 and Corollary 3, we note that the minimum detection error
probability at Alice is the same in the TS and PS schemes, which is unexpected. This means
that, although the transmission strategies at the relay are different in the TS and PS schemes, the
monitoring ability of Alice on the relay is the same, which only depends on θ , η0/η1. Finally,
this leads to that our discussions and conclusions given in Remark 1, Remark 2, and Corollary 2
on the TS scheme are also valid for the PS scheme.
D. Optimization of Covert Transmission
After subtracting the corresponding component related to xa from the received signal yb given
in (52), the effective received signal used to decode the covert information xc at Bob is
y˜b[i] =
√
P crLrbhrbxc[i] +
√
P 1r LrbhrbG
(√
(1− ρ)nr,a[i] + nr,c[i]
)
+ nb,a[i] + nb,c[i]. (70)
Then, following (70) the SNR for xc is given by
γc =
P crLrb|hrb|2
P 1r Lrb|hrb|2G2σ2r + σ2b
c
=
(Q4 −Q3)σ2b
Q3(Q4+σ2b )σ
2
r
(1−ρ)PaLar |har|2+σ2r + (Q3 + σ
2
b )σ
2
b
, (71)
where
Q3 , η0ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2,
Q4 , η1ρPaLar|har|2Lrb|hrb|2, (72)
and
c
= is obtained based on (48), (55), and (57). As per (71), considering Rayleigh fading for
har and hrb, the average rate of the covert transmission from the relay to Bob in the PS scheme
is given by
C =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log2 {1 + γc} f|har|2(x)f|hrb|2(y)dxdy
=
1
λarλrb
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−
(
x
λar
+
y
λrb
)]
×
log

1+ [Q4(x, y)−Q3(x, y)]σ
2
b
Q3(x,y)[Q4(x,y)+σ2b ]σ
2
r
(1−ρ)PaLarx+σ2r +[Q3(x, y) + σ
2
b ]σ
2
b

 dxdy. (73)
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Since T/2 is the effective communication time between relay and Bob in one block, the effective
covert rate in the PS scheme is defined as
Ψ =
(T/2)
T
C =
C
2
. (74)
Then, the optimization problem at relay of maximizing the effective covert subject to a certain
covert communication constraint is given by
max
η0≤η1≤ηu
Ψ
s. t. ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
(75)
The maximum value of Ψ is then achieved by substituting the optimal value of η1 (which is
derived in the following theorem) into (74), which is denoted by Ψ∗.
Theorem 6: For a given conversion efficiency factor η0 under H0 at relay, the optimal value
(i.e., minimum value) of η1 that achieves the maximum effective covert rate Ψ subject to the
covert communication constraint ξ∗(θ) ≥ 1− ǫ is given by
η∗1 =


η0
θǫ
, ǫ ≤
(
η0
ηu
) √ηu
2(
√
ηu−
√
η0)
(√
ηu
η0
− 1
)
,
ηu, otherwise,
(76)
where we recall that θǫ is the solution of θ to ξ
∗(θ) = 1− ǫ.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 6 is omitted here, which is similar to that of Theorem 3.
Remark 6: Based on Theorem 3 and Theorem 6, we note that the optimal values of η1 in
the TS and PS schemes are the same for a predetermined η0. This indicates that the constraint
ξ∗ ≥ 1−ǫ determines the same cost of achieving the covert transmission limits from the relay to
Bob, in terms of the increase in the conversion efficiency factor, although the achieved maximum
effective covert rates in the TS and PS schemes can be different.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide a thorough performance comparison between the TS and PS
schemes. Based on our examination, we draw many useful insights with regard to the impact
of some system parameters (e.g., Pa, η0, and ǫ ) on covert transmission with harvested energy.
Without other statements, we set λar = λrb = 1, dar = drb = 10 m, σ
2
r,a = σ
2
r,c = σ
2
b,a = σ
2
b,c =
25
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Fig. 2. The detection error probability ξ versus τ , where η0 = 0.4, η1 = 0.7, and Pa = 20 dBm.
−80 dBm, and ηu = 0.8, the path loss exponent m is set to 2, and carrier frequency fc is set to
900 MHz [28].
In Fig. 2, we plot the detection error ξ versus Alice’s detection threshold τ for the TS and PS
schemes. As expected, we first observe that the simulated curves precisely match the theoretical
ones, which confirms the correctness of our Theorem 1 and Theorem 4. We also observe the
minimum values of ξ are equal in the TS and PS schemes, which verifies the correctness of
our Theorem 3 and Theorem 6, although the optimal detection thresholds that achieve these
minimum values are different. In this figure, we further observe that the achieved detection error
probability significantly varies with respect to the detection threshold, which demonstrates the
importance of optimizing the detection threshold at Alice.
In Fig. 3, we plot the maximum effective covert rate Ψ∗ versus Pa with different values of η0
for the TS and PS schemes. In this figure, we first observe that Ψ∗ monotonically increases as
Pa increases, which demonstrates that more covert information can be transmitted when more
power is available at Alice and can be harvested at relay. In addition, in this figure we observe
that the PS scheme outperforms the TS scheme when Pa is in the high regime, since in this
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Fig. 3. The effective covert rate Ψ versus Alice’s transmit power Pa with different values of η0, where ǫ = 0.1.
regime the transmit power is not the limited resource at the relay. However, when Pa is smaller
than some specific values (e.g., when Pa ≤ 0 dBm), the performance of the TS scheme can be
better than that of the PS scheme. This observation demonstrates the necessity of allowing the
relay to switch between the TS and PS schemes (depending on the specific system parameters)
in order to achieve a higher effective covert rate, which is the main motivation to propose these
two schemes in this work.
In Fig. 4, we plot the maximum effective covert rate Ψ∗ versus η0 with different values of ǫ.
In this figure, we first observe that Ψ∗ → 0 when η0 → 0, which is due to the fact that as η0 → 0
the relay cannot forward Alice’s information to Bob and the covert transmission from the relay
to Bob cannot be performed without the shield of its forwarding action. We also observe that
Ψ∗ → 0 when η0 → ηu. This can be explained by the fact that as η0 → ηu the relay cannot
harvest extra energy from Alice to support its covert transmission. In addition, in this figure we
observe that there is a sharp turning point on each curve of Ψ∗ versus η0, which varies with the
value of ǫ. We confirm that this turning point occurs when η0/θǫ = ηu, which can be explained
by our Theorem 3 and Theorem 6. This confirms that it is the covert communication constraint
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Fig. 4. The maximum effective covert rate Ψ∗ versus η0 with different value of ǫ, where Pa = 20 dBm.
that limits Ψ∗ before the turning point, which can explain the observation that Ψ∗ increases with
ǫ before all the turning points for each scheme. This also confirms that it is the energy harvester
that limits Ψ∗ after each turning point, which can explain the observation that for different values
of ǫ we may have the same Ψ∗ after all the turning points for each scheme.
With the same system settings of Fig. 4, in Fig. 5 we plot η∗1 versus η0 with different values
of ǫ. In this figure, we first observe that η∗1 is a monotonically increasing function of η0 before it
reaches ηu. This can be explained by our Theorem 3 and Theorem 6, which indicate that η
∗
1 =
η0/θǫ that shows η
∗
1 monotonically increases with η0 since the value of θǫ is solely determined
by the given ǫ. We also observe that turning points on the curves of η∗1 versus η0 are consistent
with the ones in Fig. 4, which confirms our discussions with regard to Fig. 4. Furthermore, we
observe that the value of η0 at the turning point decreases with ǫ, which can be explained by
our Remark 2 that ξ∗ is a monotonically increasing function of θ.
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Fig. 5. η∗1 versus η0 with different value of ǫ.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work examined the possibility, performance limits, and associated costs of covert commu-
nication achieved by a self-sustained relay over quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels, in which
the relay opportunistically transmits its own information to the destination Bob covertly on top of
forwarding Alice’s information, while Alice tries to detect this covert transmission. Specifically,
we considered the TS and PS schemes at the self-sustained relay for energy harvesting and
analyzed Alice’s detection performance limit in terms of the minimum detection error probability,
based on which we determined the maximum effective covert rate Ψ∗ achieved subject ξ∗ ≥ 1−ǫ.
Our analysis indicates that the required minimum energy conversion efficiency under H1, i.e.,
η∗1 , to achieve this Ψ
∗ is the same for the TS and PS schemes, which indicates that the cost of
achieving the relay’s covert communication limits is the same, although the achievable Ψ∗ can
be different. Our analysis also demonstrates that it is the constraint ξ∗ ≥ 1 − ǫ that limits Ψ∗
when ǫ is less than a specific value determined solely by η0 and ηu, and otherwise it is ηu that
limits Ψ∗.
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